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I. FIVE DIMENSIONS 
The notice for this symposium provided that “[f]irst, we do 
not have the legal, institutional, or physical infrastructure to 
transition to cleaner energy sources.”1 There is a twist to this: 
First, we do have a multidimensional state legal infrastructure 
undertaking this, but it is being challenged as unconstitutional 
or otherwise illegal. We have not always had legally strategic 
implementation of energy infrastructure. This Article describes 
which initiatives states have adopted for sustainable energy 
promotion and what legal trip-wires they are encountering. 
Second, the conference design also declares that “we do not 
have effective governance strategies for complex, multi-level 
problems that predominate at the intersection of 
environmental and energy law.”2 At this intersection is electric 
power. More than one-third of CO2 emissions are attributable 
to the electric power sector.3 Ninety-eight percent of 
anthropogenic CO2 emissions are from combustion of fossil 
fuels.4 Fossil fuel generation results in 64% of total human-
made atmospheric CO2,5 and the International Energy Agency 
forecasts that by 2030, world demand for energy will grow by 
60%,6 with fossil fuel sources supplying 82% of the total7 and 
noncarbon renewable energy sources supplying only 6%.8 At 
current rates of energy development, energy-related CO2 
                                                          
 1. See Conference Themes: Legal & Policy Pathways for Energy 
Innovation, U. MINN., CONSORTIUM ON L. & VALUES HEALTH, ENV’T & LIFE 
SCI., http://consortium.umn.edu/lecturesconferences/conferences/lppei/themes/
home.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2013) [hereinafter Conference Themes]. 
 2. Id.  
 3. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, EMISSION OF 
GREENHOUSE GASES IN THE UNITED STATES 2005, at 16 (2006), available at 
ftp://ftp.eia.doe.gov/pub/oiaf/1605/cdrom/pdf/ggrpt/057305.pdf. 
 4. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., EMISSIONS OF GREENHOUSE GASES IN THE 
UNITED STATES 1998, at 13 (1999), available at http://www.eia.gov/
environment/archive/057398.pdf. 
 5. See Frequently Asked Global Change Questions, CARBON DIOXIDE 
INFO. ANALYSIS CENTER, http://cdiac.ornl.gov/faq.html (last visited Oct. 25, 
2013). 
 6. See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2004, at 57 
(2004). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 34. 
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emissions in 2050 would be 250% of their current levels under 
the existent pattern.9 
There is a substantial need for sustainable electric power 
development. It is the key infrastructure to determine the 
future carbon footprint. And the current sustainable energy 
policy of the United States is largely implemented at the state, 
rather than federal, level of government. Several of these state 
policies are confronting Supremacy and dormant Commerce 
Clause constitutional challenges. This Article charts the nature 
of these challenges and their legal and policy significance. 
Third, the conference design notes: “Many of our most 
daunting environmental and energy challenges cross 
jurisdictional boundaries, involve multiple levels of governance 
(e.g., local, state, regional, national, international), or both. 
Natural systems do not respect the artificial territorial and 
jurisdictional boundaries of governments, whether at the local, 
state, or national levels . . . .”10 The constitutional doctrines 
above do not respect state boundaries, prevent states from 
discriminating in their regulation based on the place of origin 
of electric power and commerce, and constrain state regulation 
of the expanding interstate wholesale power market. 
Finally, the symposium design notes that “[w]ith no single 
institution well-positioned to solve the problem, it may simply 
fall between the cracks; or it may be addressed partially and 
inadequately by one or more well-intentioned institutional 
actors . . . .”11 The legal institutional “cracks” are significant—
and this symposium Article works in the Fifth Dimension. 
Some will remember that the Fifth Dimension was a music 
group, famous for hit songs such as Aquarius/Let the Sunshine 
In.12 I suppose that this song about letting the sunshine in 
                                                          
 9. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, ENERGY TECHNOLOGY PERSPECTIVES: 
SCENARIOS AND STRATEGIES TO 2050, at 25 (2006), available at 
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/6106201e.pdf?expires=
1384129338&id=id&accname=ocid195223&checksum=2FB3960ABB42D0D37
E970E8D23FA2806 (“In the Baseline Scenario for this study, CO2 emissions 
will be almost two and a half times the current level by 2050.”). 
 10. Conference Themes, supra note 1. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Their hits include Aquarius/Let the Sunshine In and Wedding Bell 
Blues, on THE AGE OF AQUARIUS (Soul City Records 1969); (Last Night) I 
Didn’t Get to Sleep at All, on INDIVIDUALLY & COLLECTIVELY (Bell Records 
1972); The Magic Garden, on THE MAGIC GARDEN (Soul City Records 1967); 
One Less Bell to Answer, on PORTRAIT (Bell Records 1970); Stoned Soul Picnic, 
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could be an appropriate embarkation point for a discussion that 
includes renewable power. Nonetheless, for my purposes here, 
the Five Dimensions are: 
 The First Dimension: Basic state governance powers on 
power; the Supremacy Clause affecting feed-in tariffs 
and net metering; 
 The Second Dimension: Do power unto others . . . ; The 
dormant Commerce Clause applied to renewable 
portfolio standards and state benefit charges; 
 The Third Dimension: The First and Second Dimensions 
combined on energy; 
 The Fourth Dimension: State power regarding 
transmission rights of first refusal; and 
 The Fifth Dimension: Beyond power to climate issues. 
The next sections of this Article take us into the Five 
Dimensions of U.S. federal and state sustainable energy policy 
and through the legal cracks in its infrastructure and 
governance. States have sculpted sustainable energy policy 
around five dimensions of legal and policy initiatives: 
 Net metering: In 86% of states;13 
 Renewable portfolio standards: In 58% of states;14 
 Renewable system benefit charges: In 30% of states;15 
 Carbon and greenhouse gas (GHG) regulation: In 24% of 
states;16 
 Feed-in tariffs: In 14% of states.17 
                                                          
on STONED SOUL PICNIC (Soul City Records 1968); Up, Up and Away, on UP, 
UP AND AWAY (Soul City Records 1967). Aquarius/Let the Sunshine In was 
featured in the movie FORREST GUMP (Paramount Pictures 1994) and was 
ranked at #57 on Billboard’s “Greatest Songs of All Time” and at #33 on the 
2004 AFI’s “100 Years of Songs.” 
 13. Net Metering, DATABASE ST. INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & 
EFFICIENCY, http://www.dsireusa.org/documents/summarymaps/net_
metering_map.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2013). 
 14. Renewable Portfolio Standards, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/agstar/tools/funding/renewable.html (last updated Sept. 
27, 2012). 
 15. Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, Public 
Benefits Funds for Renewables, PowerPoint Presentation 1 (2013) [hereinafter 
Public Benefit Funds], available at http://www.dsireusa.org/documents/
summarymaps/PBF_Map.pptx. 
 16. Energy Regulation in the States: A Wake-up Call, INST. FOR ENERGY 
RES., 6, http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/pdf/statereport.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 23, 2013). 
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Through each of the sustainable policies above, higher 
charges are levied in retail utility bills, which have been cause 
for ongoing litigation. One of these five state initiatives was 
stricken at the trial level as unconstitutional,18 reversed by a 
split panel on appeal and now subject to a request for rehearing 
en banc.19 Others were stated to be unconstitutional in the 
method that some states have implemented them,20 and a 
recent federal adjudicatory order casts legal uncertainty on 
another of these five initiatives.21 Next, into the First 
Dimension. 
II. THE FIRST DIMENSION: HARD, ‘BRIGHT’ LINES FOR 
BASIC GOVERNANCE POWERS ON POWER 
A. FEED-IN TARIFFS 
Feed-in tariffs (FiTs) are regulatory requirements imposed 
by some states on their regulated utilities to purchase certain 
designated types of independent power generation on a 
wholesale basis, typically from renewable resources or 
combined heat and power (CHP) units, at prices well in excess 
of the market value of wholesale power.22 The regulated 
utilities are directed by law and regulation to “buy high” on 
wholesale in terms of other electric power available in the 
market.23 
                                                          
 17. Feed-In Tariffs and Similar Programs, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/policies/provider_programs.cfm (last updated 
June 4, 2013). 
 18. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 
1099 (E.D. Cal. 2011). 
 19. Rocky Mountanin Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 
2013). 
 20. Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 721 F.3d 
764 (7th Cir. 2013); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Schuette v. FERC, No. 13-
443 (Oct. 7, 2013); see also Ann Carlson, Court Casts Doubt on 
Constitutionality of Michigan’s Renewable Portfolio Standard, Upholds Cost 
Sharing for Transmission Lines, LEGALPLANET (June 11, 2013), http://legal-
planet.org/2013/06/11/court-strikes-down-michigans-renewable-portfolio-
standard-as-unconstitutional-upholds-cost-sharing-for-transmission-lines. 
 21. See Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 132 FERC ¶ 61,047, ¶¶ 61,337–61,338 
(2010). 
 22. See NAT’L RURAL ELECTRIC COOP. ASS’N, FEED-IN TARIFFS 1 (2013), 
available at http://www.nreca.coop/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/FeedInTariffs_
WhitePaper.pdf. 
 23. See id. at 1–2. Electric power in the Northeast has been available at 
an average price during the past years of $0.05/kilowatt hour (kWh) or less. 
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Sections 205 and 206 of the Federal Power Act (FPA)24 
empower the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 
exclusively to regulate rates for the interstate and wholesale 
sale and transmission of electricity.25 The U.S. Supreme Court 
held that Congress meant to draw a “bright line,” easily 
ascertained and not requiring case-by-case analysis, between 
state and federal jurisdiction.26 When a transaction is subject 
to exclusive FERC jurisdiction and regulation, state regulation 
is preempted as a matter of federal law and the U.S. 
Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, according to a long-standing 
and consistent line of rulings by the U.S. Supreme Court.27 The 
FERC has “exclusive authority to regulate the transmission 
and sale at wholesale of electric energy in interstate 
commerce . . . .”28 If states impose a rate in excess of avoided 
cost (the wholesale value of power in the market) by either “law 
                                                          
See Conway Irwin, Phasing Out the PTC as Wind Nears Grid Parity, 
BREAKING ENERGY (Oct. 16, 2013, 2:00 PM), http://breakingenergy.com/
2013/10/16/phasing-out-the-ptc-as-wind-nears-grid-parity/. The Vermont feed-
in tariffs for power of this value were set for wind of less than 15 kW at 
$0.20/kWh, for wind more than 15 kW at $0.125/kWh, and for solar generation 
at $0.30/kWh. LOLA INFANTE ET AL., EDISON ELEC. INST., FEED-IN TARIFFS IN 
EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 39 (2009), available at 
http://www3.eei.org/meetings/Meeting%20Documents/2010-03-15-rrac-FITs-
background-paper.pdf. 
 24. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d–824e (2012). 
 25. See Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cnty. Wash. v. FERC, 471 
F.3d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, 547 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 26. Fed. Power Comm’n v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215–16 
(1964). 
 27. See Entergy La., Inc. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 539 U.S. 39, 47 
(2003); Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 374 
(1988); Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 963–66 
(1986); Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Nw. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 341 U.S. 246, 
251 (1951). The Supreme Court overturned an order of the New Hampshire 
Public Utilities Commission that restrained within the state, for the financial 
advantage of in-state ratepayers, low-cost hydroelectric energy produced 
within the state. New Eng. Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 344 
(1982). It held this to be an impermissible violation of Article 1, Section 8, 
Clause 3 of the dormant Commerce Clause and the FPA: “Our cases 
consistently have held that the Commerce Clause of the 
Constitution . . . precludes a state from mandating that its residents be given 
a preferred right of access, over out-of-state consumers, to natural resources 
located within its borders or to the products derived therefrom.” Id. at 338. 
 28. New Eng. Power Co., 455 U.S. at 340. 
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or policy,” the “contracts will be considered to be void ab 
initio.”29 
Several states moved to decouple the amount of revenue 
earned by a regulated utility from lock-step with the amount of 
power it can produce and sell.30 Such retail reward is entirely 
within state authority. Decoupling of electric utility rates, as of 
2013, had been approved in some form in fourteen states.31 
California, New York, New Jersey, Maryland, and 
Massachusetts are the five states leading decoupling.32 These 
                                                          
 29. Conn. Light & Power Co., 70 FERC ¶ 61,012, ¶¶ 61,029–61,030 
(1995). For a case where states did not have authority to lower wholesale 
renewable power sale rates, see Indep. Energy Producers Ass’n v. Cal. Pub. 
Utils. Comm’n, 36 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 1994); S. Cal. Edison Co., 70 FERC 
¶ 61,215, ¶¶ 61,677–61,679 (1995). 
 30. See, e.g., INNOVATION ELEC. EFFICIENCY, STATE ELECTRIC 
EFFICIENCY REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS 1 (2013), available at 
http://www.edisonfoundation.net/iee/Documents/IEE_StateRegulatoryFrame_
0713.pdf. The names used for decoupling vary, including “Billing Determinant 
Adjustment,” “Volume Balancing Adjustment,” and “Bill Stabilization Rider.” 
See Pamela G. Lesh & Dylan Sullivan, Rate Impacts and Key Design Elements 
of Gas and Electric Utility Decoupling: A Comprehensive View, NATURAL RES. 
DEF. COUNCIL, http://aceee.org/files/pdf/conferences/eer/2009/1D_Sullivan
_Lesh.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2013). 
 31. See INNOVATION ELEC. EFFICIENCY, supra note 30, at 5. Most of these 
states had adopted lost revenue recovery provisions to make regulated utilities 
“whole” for pursuing lower sales volume in favor of greater energy efficiency. 
In 2007, California implemented a risk-reward incentive mechanism (RRIM) 
in conjunction with its four largest utilities whereby utilities receive “rewards” 
if they meet specific energy efficiency goals. TOM ROBERTS, AM. COUNCIL FOR 
AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., CALIFORNIA’S SHAREHOLDER INCENTIVE 
MECHANISM: A RATEPAYER PERSPECTIVE 4-76 (2009), available at 
http://aceee.org/files/proceedings/2009/data/papers/4_78.pdf. Under the RRIM, 
utilities are allowed to recover a percentage of the total net savings (savings 
minus costs) from energy efficiency if they achieved a minimum of 85% of the 
program goals. Id. at 4-80. In this program, utilities were also subject to a 
penalty if performance fell below 65% of goals. Id. Performance between 65% 
and 85% resulted in no penalties and no rewards. Id. The Massachusetts 
Department of Public Utilities issued an order that establishes a new base 
rate adjustment mechanism that decouples utility companies’ revenues from 
company electricity sales. Investigation by the Department of Public Utilities 
on its own Motion into Rate Structures That Will Promote Efficient 
Deployment of Demand Resources, Order No. 07-50-A, at 86–88 (Mass. D.P.U. 
July 16, 2008), available at http://www.env.state.ma.us/DPU_FileRoom/
frmDocketListSP.aspx (search “Docket Number” for “07-50,” then open 
“Order” dated “July 16, 2008”). 
 32. See Cathy Cash, Decoupling Mandate Keeps the Pot Stirred as 
Congress Advances Stimulus Package, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Feb. 2, 2009, at 3 
(noting that “[a]ccording to NRDC”, these five states “have adopted decoupling 
revenue mechanisms for both gas and electric utilities” while “[t]hirty-seven 
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are the states that led electric utility restructuring and retail 
deregulation in the late 1990s,33 that led the development of 
renewable portfolio standards and renewable system benefit 
charges also in the late 1990s,34 and led state carbon regulation 
in 2009.35 
The Supreme Court in 1986, and again in 1988, 2003, and 
2008, reaffirmed and enforced exclusive federal jurisdiction 
pursuant to the Filed Rate Doctrine when states attempted to 
assert jurisdiction inconsistent with the FERC’s exclusive 
authority over wholesale rate and term determinations.36 
California lost its case in 2010 when attempting to defend its 
state feed-in tariffs for renewable power.37 A challenge by 
regional generators of power in the Mid-Atlantic states against 
New Jersey’s in-state energy facility location preferences for 
new power generation resulted in changes in the FERC-
approved regional PJM Independent System Operator 
procedures, and thereafter, now face pending constitutional 
challenges in federal court.38 
An increasing majority of U.S. power now proceeds 
through a wholesale power sale prior to its ultimate retail 
                                                          
states have taken no steps toward electric decoupling and [thirty-three] have 
not adopted decoupling for gas”). 
 33. See STEVEN FERREY, THE NEW RULES: A GUIDE TO ELECTRIC MARKET 
DEREGULATION 135–57 (2000) [hereinafter THE NEW RULES] (describing 
deregulation of electricity retail markets, focusing on deregulation policy in 
California and Massachusetts); 2 STEVEN FERREY, THE LAW OF INDEPENDENT 
POWER: DEVELOPMENT/COGENERATION/UTILITY REGULATION §§ 10:6–10:12 
(30th ed. 2013) [hereinafter 2 INDEPENDENT POWER]. 
 34. See Steven Ferrey, Sustainable Energy, Environmental Policy, and 
States’ Rights: Discerning the Energy Future Through the Eye of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 507, 645–71 (2004). 
 35. See Steven Ferrey, Goblets of Fire: Potential Constitutional 
Impediments to the Regulation of Global Warming, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 835, 843, 
845–46 (2008). 
 36. See Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 963 
(1986) (holding that the Filed Rate Doctrine limitations also apply “to 
decisions of state courts”); see also Morgan Stanley Capital Grp., Inc. v. Pub. 
Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cnty., 554 U.S. 527, 531 (2008); Entergy La., 
Inc. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 539 U.S. 39, 47 (2003); Miss. Power & Light Co. 
v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 372 (1988). 
 37. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 132 FERC ¶ 61,047, ¶¶ 61,337–61,338 
(2010). 
 38. See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 135 FERC ¶ 61,022, ¶¶ 61,091, 
61,093, order clarified on reh’g by 137 FERC ¶ 61,145 (2011). 
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disposition,39 thereby fundamentally altering the legal analysis 
of what is and is not now constitutional for a state, as opposed 
to the federal government, to regulate.40 A large number of 
independent renewable power generators now sell their power 
wholesale to redistributing utilities and others that thereafter 
resell that power to retail customers.41 A few states have tried 
to impose FiTs on utilities and their ratepayers for favored 
renewable power sales at wholesale to the utilities.42 There is a 
“bright line” legally prohibiting state regulation.43 
B. NET METERING 
Net metering is the most utilized state incentive for 
renewable power nationwide, in place in more than 85% of U.S. 
states.44 Net metering is an accounting concept typically 
applied to renewable sources of distributed power self-
generated on the utility customer’s side of the retail utility 
meter.45 Each of the forty-three state net metering programs is 
distinct.46 There are differences as to allowable sizes of units, 
                                                          
 39. See ELEC. ENERGY MKT. COMPETITION TASK FORCE, REPORT TO 
CONGRESS ON COMPETITION IN WHOLESALE AND RETAIL MARKETS FOR 
ELECTRIC ENERGY 10 (2006), available at http://www.ferc.gov/legal/fed-
sta/ene-pol-act/epact-final-rpt.pdf (“In the 1970s, vertically integrated utility 
companies (investor-owned, municipal, or cooperative) controlled over 95 
percent of the electric generation in the United States . . . . [B]y 2004 electric 
utilities owned less than 60 percent of electric generating capacity. 
Increasingly, decisions affecting retail customers and electricity rates are split 
among federal, state, and new private, regional entities.”). 
 40. 1 STEVEN FERREY, THE LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER: 
DEVELOPMENT/COGENERATION/UTILITY REGULATION §§ 5:26–5:28 (30th ed. 
2013) [hereinafter 1 INDEPENDENT POWER]; see STEVEN FERREY, 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 460–61 (1997) 
[hereinafter FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW]. 
 41. See FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 40, at 461. 
 42. See JULIE TAYLOR, NAT’L ASS’N OF REGULATORY UTIL. COMM’RS, 
FEED-IN TARIFFS (FIT): FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS FOR STATE UTILITY 
COMMISSIONS 8–9 (2010), available at http://www.naruc.org/Publications/
NARUC%20Feed%20in%20Tariff%20FAQ.pdf. 
 43. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 44. See Net Metering, supra note 13. 
 45. See Generating Your Own Electricity: Net Metering, PUB. UTIL. 
COMM’N OHIO, http://www.puco.ohio.gov/puco/index.cfm/consumerinformation/
consumer-topics/generating-your-own-electricity-net-metering (last visited 
Oct. 26, 2013). 
 46. See Net Metering, supra note 13; Net Metering, SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. 
ASS’N, http://www.seia.org/policy/distributed-solar/net-metering (last visited 
Oct. 26, 2013). 
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the vintage and longevity of credits, whether credits can be 
cashed out, eligible classes of customers, and eligible 
technologies.47 
When the customer purchases and uses electricity from the 
distribution company, the meter runs forward; when more 
electricity is produced from the facility than is consumed by the 
customer, the excess is sent to the electricity grid, running the 
meter in reverse direction and reversing the net accounting of 
power flow.48 By turning the meter backwards, since only a 
single rate applies to a single meter, net metering effectively 
compensates the generator at the full retail rate (which 
includes approximately two-thirds of the retail bill that is 
attributable to transmission, distribution, and taxes49) for 
transferring just the wholesale energy commodity—the power 
itself.50 Accounting at the retail rate multiplies by several-fold 
the effective value or revenue earned from the wholesale power 
transaction of supplying wholesale power to the utility.51 
In 2001, the FERC held that state net metering decisions 
were not preempted by federal law.52 In its order, the FERC 
                                                          
 47. See, e.g., Net Metering, supra note 13. 
 48. See Generating Your Own Electricity: Net Metering, supra note 45. 
 49. See Herman K. Trabish, Arizona’s Biggest Utility Proposes a Cut to 
Net Metering, GREENTECHSOLAR (July 12, 2013), 
http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/arizonas-biggest-utility-
proposes-to-a-cut-to-net-metering. 
 50. See Rick Tempchin, Time to Rethink Metering Rules: Cost and 
Fairness, INTELLIGENT UTIL. (May 28, 2013), 
http://www.intelligentutility.com/article/13/05/time-rethink-metering-rules-
cost-and-fairness. As to whether electricity is a “good” or a “service” and how it 
should be treated under the law, see THE NEW RULES, supra note 33, at    
212–23. 
 51. See Tempchin, supra note 50. The retail rate of NSTAR power is close 
to $0.17/kWh in 2013 for retail residential customers, while the ISO-NE 
wholesale rate for that power is less than $0.05/kWh. See, e.g., GREEN 
CARLISLE, COMPUTING THE ROI OF A SOLAR ENERGY SYSTEM 2 (2013), 
available at http://greencarlisle.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/
Computing-the-ROI-of-a-solar-energy-system.pdf (“Using a current NSTAR 
rate of $0.17 per kWh . . . .”). See Hourly Data, ISO NEW ENGLAND, ISO-
NE.com (last visited Oct. 26, 2013), for real-time market data on wholesale 
prices. 
 52. MidAmerican Energy Co., 94 FERC ¶ 61,340, ¶¶ 62,262–62,264 
(2001). In March 2001, MidAmerican Energy Company challenged before the 
FERC the state of Iowa’s regulations “directing MidAmerican to interconnect 
with three Alternate Energy facilities and to offer net billing arrangements to 
those facilities.” Id. ¶ 62,261. MidAmerican also requested a declaratory order 
that federal law preempted these regulations. Id. MidAmerican asked the 
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held that no sale occurs when an individual installs distributed 
generation and accounts for its dealings with the utility 
through the practice of netting.53 Net metering is not deemed a 
retail or wholesale sale of power, and therefore, not subject to 
any federal law limitations on the price implications of net 
metering.54 In the 2009 Sun Edison case, the FERC determined 
that it lacks jurisdiction over the generator if there is no net 
sale of power to the utility over the billing period.55 There is no 
net sale unless the customer sells back more energy than the 
back-up power it consumes within the billing period.56 While 
neither the MidAmerican case nor the Sun Edison case 
presented such facts of a net power flow to the utility from the 
net metered generator, both decisions meticulously and 
exhaustively limited this legal finding only to situations where 
there was no net flow of power back to the power grid.57 
In Rhode Island, there is a challenge to net metering where 
the wind generator at the Portsmouth High School is directly 
interconnected to the distribution grid rather than first serving 
a substantial host load, thus having virtually 100% of net 
power flow back to the grid.58 
III. THE SECOND DIMENSION: DOING POWER           
UNTO OTHERS . . .  
A. RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS 
Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) require electric 
utilities and other retail electric providers to include in their 
                                                          
commission to undertake enforcement action against the Iowa Board or to 
issue a declaratory order that the final orders of the Iowa Board are 
preempted by PURPA. Id. 
 53. Id. ¶ 62,263. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See Sun Edison LLC, 129 FERC ¶ 61,146, ¶61,621 (2009), modified on 
reh’g, 131 FERC ¶ 61,213 (2010). 
 56. Id. 
 57. See id. ¶¶ 61,620–61,621; MidAmerican Energy Co., 94 FERC, 
¶ 62,263. 
 58. See In re Complaint by Benjamin Riggs relating to Net Metering at 
the Portsmouth Wind Generator Facility & Nat’l Grid-Electric, No. D-10-126 
(R.I. P.U.C. May 19, 2010), available at http://www.ripuc.org/
eventsactions/docket/D-10-126-Riggs-Portsmouth-Ord20510%2810-13-
11%29.pdf (arguing that as an independent wholesale project, the wind 
generator can be paid no more than the avoided cost afforded to Qualifying 
Facilities under PURPA). 
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retail sales annually a specified percentage of electricity supply 
from specified renewable energy sources in the form of acquired 
Renewable Energy Credits (RECs).59 Thirty-eight U.S. states 
and the District of Columbia have RPS.60 The current RPS 
standards are projected to add 76,750 megawatts of additional 
renewable generation by 2025.61 
“Most states allow solar, wind, biomass, and landfill gas 
resources to qualify in RPS programs; states are less consistent 
regarding eligibility for biogas, municipal solid waste (MSW), 
geothermal, [all] hydro resources, fuel cells, and ocean tidal 
renewable resources to qualify.”62 Renewable power standards 
in the state RPS programs have faced recent efforts to repeal or 
weaken them in Ohio, Michigan, Kansas, Missouri, North 
Carolina, Vermont, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Maryland, and 
Wisconsin.63 These states constitute about one-fourth of the 
states that have RPS programs.64 In other states, while 
maintaining the renewable percentage generation 
requirements, states have broadened or are considering 
broadening the definition of “renewable” energy to include 
technologies not normally associated with renewable energy.65 
Some states have considered allowing existing, rather than 
new, resources to qualify,66 and Oregon, Montana, and Maine 
                                                          
 59. See Renewable Portfolio Standards, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION 
AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/agstar/tools/funding/renewable.html (last visited 
Oct. 9, 2013); SREC FAQ, SOLSYSTEMS, http://www.solsystemscompany.com/
our-resources/srec-knowledge-center/srec-faq (last visited Oct. 26, 2013). 
 60. See Rules, Regulations & Policies for Renewable Energy, DATABASE 
ST. INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, www.dsireusa.org/
summarytables/rrpre.cfm (last visited Oct. 11, 2013). 
 61. Brad Plumer, The Biggest Fight over Renewable Energy Is Now in the 
States, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (Mar. 25, 2013, 4:01 PM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/03/25/the-biggest-
fights-over-renewable-energy-are-now-happening-in-the-states. 
 62. See Steven Ferrey, Follow the Money! Article I and Article VI 
Constitutional Barriers to Renewable Energy in the U.S. Future, 17 VA. J.L. & 
TECH. 89, 98 (2012). 
 63. See Herman K. Trabish, Numbers from the War on State Renewables 
Standards, GREENTECHMEDIA (Mar. 25, 2013), www.greentechmedia.com/
articles/read/numbers-from-the-war-on-state-renewables-standards. 
 64. See id.; Rules, Regulations & Policies for Renewable Energy, supra 
note 60. 
 65. See Trabish, supra note 63. 
 66. Id. (noting Washington’s “effort to allow already built hydroelectric 
projects to count toward the state’s 15 percent by 2020 standard”). 
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are considering adding hydropower,67 which many states do not 
include. Maryland has considered including natural gas-power 
electric generation, while Wisconsin has considered nuclear 
power generation.68 West Virginia and Massachusetts allow 
coal-derived fuels producing power to qualify.69 
About three-quarters of California’s 33% renewable energy 
goal legally must come from California pursuant to state 
regulation “even though other states can produce renewables at 
lower cost due to natural resource advantages (e.g., wind in 
Wyoming). Democrats say this is important to foster energy 
independence. You never know when Utah will bomb 
Wyoming.”70 There are a number of the thirty-eight U.S. states 
with RPS that have incorporated credit multipliers and 
geographic restrictions or preferences to promote in-state/in-
region generation of power, to the exclusion of external power: 
 Eight of the thirty-eight RPS states, or 21%, have REC 
multipliers for in-state generation: Arizona,71 Colorado,72 
Delaware,73 Maine,74 Michigan,75 Missouri,76 Nevada,77 
and Washington.78 
 Four of the RPS states, or about 10%, including two 
states that also provide for a geographically 
discriminatory REC multiplier, have either a 
requirement or preference for in-state generation: 
California,79 Colorado,80 North Carolina,81 and Ohio.82 
                                                          
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. California’s Coming Green-Outs: The Wind and Solar Mandate Means 
Future Power Shortages, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 29, 2013, 6:46 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014241278873245828045783445004146307
78.html (subscription required). 
 71. ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R14-2-1806(D) (2009). 
 72. COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-2-124(c)(IX) (2013). 
 73. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 26, § 356(a)–(c) (Supp. 2012). 
 74. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 35-A, § 3605 (2010). 
 75. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 460.1039 (West Supp. 2013). 
 76. MO. ANN. STAT. § 393.1030(1)(4) (West 2011). 
 77. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 704.7822(1) (LexisNexis 2009). 
 78. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 194-37-110 (2008). 
 79. See California Renewables Portfolio Standard, DATABASE ST. 
INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, http://www.dsireusa.org/
incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive_Code=CA25R&re=1&ee=1 (last visited Oct. 
7, 2013) (explaining that a maximum of twenty-five percent of RPS compliance 
can be achieved through the use of tradable renewable energy credits; 
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 Four of the thirty-eight RPS states, or about 10%, give 
program preferences to the use of in-state manufactured 
products or in-state labor forces: Arizona,83 Delaware,84 
Michigan,85 and Montana.86 
 Eleven of the thirty-eight RPS states, representing 28%, 
have a requirement for in-region, rather than in-state, 
geographic location of generation to create RECs, 
including one of the states that also has in-state 
multipliers and one with an in-state preference: 
Connecticut,87 Illinois,88 Maine,89 Maryland,90 
Massachusetts,91 New Hampshire,92 North Carolina93, 
Ohio,94 Oregon,95 Pennsylvania,96 and Rhode Island.97 
 Eleven of the thirty-eight states, or 28%, have an in-
state requirement for certain distributed power. 
 Four of the thirty-eight states, or about 10%, have a 
benefit for an in-state capital component or labor. 
 Some states have multiple multipliers and preferences.98 
 Only seven of the thirty-eight states have no geographic 
preferences in their laws. 
The legal issues associated with the regulatory 
requirement for regulated utilities to purchase credits from 
renewable power generation originating only or principally 
                                                          
therefore, the remainder of the RPS compliance must be attained through in-
state power sales). 
 80. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-124(e)(II–III) (West 2011). 
 81. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 62-133.8(b)(2)(e) (LexisNexis 2011). 
 82. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4928.64(B)(3) (West 2011). 
 83. ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R14-2-1806(E) (2009). 
 84. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 26, § 356(d)–(e) (Supp. 2012). 
 85. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 460.1039(2)(d)–(e) (West Supp. 2013). 
 86. MONT. CODE ANN. § 69-3-2005(3)(a) (2013). 
 87. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 16-245a(b) (West Supp. 2013). 
 88. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 3855/1-56(b) (West 2011). 
 89. See 65-407-311 ME. CODE R. § 6(D) (LexisNexis 2011). 
 90. MD. CODE REGS. 20.61.03(D) (2011). 
 91. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 25A, § 11F(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013). 
 92. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362-F:6(IV)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012). 
 93. Territory Served, PJM INTERCONNECTION, http://www.pjm.com/about-
pjm/who-we-are/territory-served.aspx (last visited Oct. 20, 2013). 
 94. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4928.64(C)(4)(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012). 
 95. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 469A.135(1)(a) (West Supp. 2013). 
 96. See 73 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1648.4 (West Supp. 2013). 
 97. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-26-4(d) (Supp. 2012). 
 98. See, e.g., ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R14-2-1806(D)–(E) (2009). 
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within the state, and whether that affected power is in 
interstate commerce, are discussed below in Part III.C. 
B.    SYSTEM BENEFITS CHARGES 
A system benefits charge (SBC) is a per-kilowatt-hour 
power surcharge imposed on all retail electricity consumers 
within a state utility’s service territory through monthly utility 
bills, which creates an additional state-controlled or 
administered energy fund.99 These state renewable trust funds 
distribute money to subsidize various renewable energy 
resource projects and technologies pursuant to state 
legislatures.100 Approximately one-third of U.S. states have 
enacted SBC and “public benefit funds.”101 Eighteen states, 
plus the District of Columbia, are included through a small 
surcharge on electricity bills.102 The funds created a range in 
size from less than $1 million to greater than $300 million per 
year.103 A number of these states, either explicitly or as a 
matter of practice, will fund only sustainable energy projects 
within their own states, even though power from all sources in 
and outside the state are taxed to create the SBC fund.104 
Some states de jure or de facto restrict SBC funds to in-
state projects.105 Illinois, for example, intends to benefit from 
“developing new renewable energy resources and clean coal 
                                                          
 99. See 2 INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 33, § 10:114. 
 100. See Public Benefits Funds, supra note 15. 
 101. Id. (stating that fifteen states, Washington, D.C., and Puerto Rico 
have public benefit funds); see ELIZABETH DORIS ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE 
ENERGY LAB., STATE OF THE STATES 2009: RENEWABLE ENERGY 
DEVELOPMENT AND THE ROLE OF POLICY 65–66 (2009), available at 
http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy10osti/46667.pdf. 
 102. See Public Benefits Funds, supra note 15. 
 103. See Gary McNeil, State Clean Energy Funds Fact Sheet, U.S. ENVTL. 
PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/chp/policies/funds_fs.html (last 
updated Apr. 2009). 
 104. See 2 INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 33, § 10:114; Kirsten H. 
Engel, The Dormant Commerce Clause Threat to Market-Based Environmental 
Regulation: The Case of Electricity Deregulation, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 243, 295 
(1999) (“The electricity burdened by the [system benefits] charge includes both 
electricity generated within the state and that imported from out-of-state 
sources . . . . As with the renewable portfolio standard a state’s primary 
interest lies in supporting its own in-state renewables industry. It is only 
rational that the state will use the funds collected through the surcharge to 
subsidize in-state industries exclusively.”). 
 105. See, e.g., 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 687/6-2 (2013). 
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technologies for use in Illinois”106 and distribute these funds 
based on criteria that “promote the goal of fostering investment 
in and the development and use, in Illinois, of renewable 
energy resources.”107 Illinois has not been challenged; however, 
New York utilities, in 2011, challenged New York’s alleged 
misuse of system benefit charge funds for non-energy-related 
economic development programs.108 
C.  LEGAL CONCERNS 
The constitutional dormant Commerce Clause prohibits 
state regulatory actions that are facially discriminatory against 
private interstate commerce.109 The dormant Commerce Clause 
precedent is “driven by concern about ‘economic 
protectionism—that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit 
in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state 
competitors.’”110 State statutes found to discriminate against 
out-of-state commerce interests based on geography or favoring 
local interests, are found to be per se invalid.111 Discriminatory 
statutes are subject to “strict scrutiny,” weighing a compelling 
state interest that is the least restrictive means to achieve that 
interest.112 
                                                          
 106. Id. 
 107. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 687/6-3(b) (2013) (emphasis added); see also id. 
687/6-4(b) (“The Renewable Energy Resources Trust Fund shall be 
administered by the Department to provide grants, loans, and other incentives 
to foster investment in and the development and use of renewable resources as 
provided in Section 6-3 . . . or pursuant to the Illinois Renewable Fuels 
Development Program Act.”). 
 108. Lisa Wood, New York Utilities Challenge Proposal to Use Clean 
Energy Funds for Economic Development, ELEC. UTIL. WK., Aug. 1, 2011, at 17 
(noting that the utilities charged that the funds must be devoted to utility-
based programs, rather than start-up companies and under-used 
technologies). 
 109. See Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338 (2008) (citing 
Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 100 (1994)). 
 110. Id. at 337–38 (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 
269, 273–74 (1988)). 
 111. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 297–98 (1997); Or. 
Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Env’t Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994); City of 
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (noting that if a statute 
is facially discriminatory, it is virtually per se invalid). 
 112. See Dep’t of Revenue of Ky., 553 U.S. at 338 (“A discriminatory law is 
virtually per se invalid . . . and will survive only if it advances a legitimate 
local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable 
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The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the scope of 
commerce among the states is broadly defined.113 In-state coal 
cannot be required to be used by a state even for the rationale 
of satisfying federal Clean Air Act requirements;114 income tax 
credits cannot be given by a state only to in-state producers of 
fuel additives;115 a state cannot regulate in favor of, or require 
the use of, its own in-state energy resources,116 nor can it by 
regulation harbor energy-related resources originating in the 
state from leaving the state117: 
[We] consistently have held that the Commerce Clause of the 
Constitution . . . precludes a state from mandating that its residents 
be given a preferred right of access, over out‐of‐state consumers, to 
natural resources located within its borders or to the products 
derived therefrom . . . . [A] State is without power to prevent 
privately owned articles of trade from being shipped and sold in 
interstate commerce on the ground that they are required to satisfy 
local demands or because they are needed by the people of the 
State.118 
Electrons in interstate commerce cannot be traced.119 The 
Constitution further applies to the sale and transmission of 
electric energy in interstate commerce120: “[I]t is difficult to 
conceive of a more basic element of interstate commerce than 
electric energy, a product used in virtually every home and 
every commercial or manufacturing facility. No state relies 
solely on its own resources in this respect.”121 
                                                          
nondiscriminatory alternatives.” (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted)). 
 113. See City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 627 (holding that a state cannot 
discriminate against articles of commerce originating in other states “unless 
there is a reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently” (emphasis 
added)). 
 114. Alliance for Clean Coal v. Miller, 44 F.3d 591, 593, 596–97 (7th Cir. 
1995). 
 115. New Energy Co. of Ind., 486 U.S. at 271, 278–80. 
 116. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454–56 (1992); Alliance for 
Clean Coal v. Craig, 840 F. Supp. 554, 560 (N.D. Ill. 1993). 
 117. New Eng. Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 339 (1982). 
 118. Id. at 338 (internal quotations omitted). 
 119. See New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 7 n.5 (2002) (discussing Fed. 
Power Comm’n v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453 (1972)). 
 120. See id.; see also id. at 17 (determining that transmissions on the 
interconnected national grids constitute transmissions in interstate 
commerce). 
 121. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 757 (1982). 
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Major states have recently encountered litigation on this 
very constitutional issue regarding such state renewable power 
regulation allegedly violating the Commerce Clause122: 
 A challenge by conventional power generators in New 
Jersey to in-state energy facility preferences;123 as well 
as similar challenges in Maryland,124 with both held not 
                                                          
 122. Cf. Complaint for Injunctive & Declaratory Relief at 2, Am. Tradition 
Inst. v. Colorado, No. 11-cv-00859 (D. Colo. Apr. 4, 2011) (addressing the 
constitutionality of Colorado’s renewable energy standard); Complaint at 1, 
TransCanada Power Mktg. Ltd. v. Bowles, No. 4:10-cv-40070 (D. Mass. Apr. 
16, 2010) (addressing the constitutionality of Massachusetts’ renewable 
energy programs). 
 123. See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 135 FERC ¶ 61,022, order clarified 
on reh’g by 137 FERC ¶ 61,145 (2011). In 2011, New Jersey enacted legislation 
to encourage the acquisition by utilities of the output of 2000 megawatts of 
new in-state power projects. Id. at 61,089. New Jersey faces a pending lawsuit 
by several existing independent power generators asserting that the state law 
is in violation of the Constitution’s Commerce Clause because it is predicated 
on in-state “favoritism.” See Hannah Northey, Energy Markets: Utilities 
Challenge N.J. Law While Preparing to Reap Its Benefits, GREENWIRE (Mar. 2, 
2011), http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2011/03/02/4. The New Jersey 
act is an explicit effort to promote the construction of new generation facilities 
in New Jersey, and the statute allegedly discriminates by ordering utilities to 
sign long-term contracts only with in-state generation facilities participating 
in multi-state PJM ISO capacity. See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 135 FERC 
¶ 61,022, ¶ 61,089, order clarified on reh’g by 137 FERC ¶ 61,145 (2011); Mary 
Powers, PJM Generators File Complaint with FERC Seeking Relief from NJ 
In-State Generation Law, ELEC. UTIL. WK., Feb. 7, 2011, at 11, 13. In 
response, the FERC amended the PJM ISO rules to prevent New Jersey state 
law from attempting to encourage construction of in-state power generation 
by, in part, causing them to bid power into the PJM system at suppressed 
prices in order to win capacity right auctions. See Mary Powers, Rebuffed by 
FERC Ruling, New Jersey BPU Plans to Look Again at How to Attract New 
Generation, ELEC. UTIL. WK., May 23, 2011, at 4, 6, available at 
http://www.electricdrive.org/sites/testing/index.php?ht=a/GetDocumentAction/
i/22845. FERC, on April 12, 2011, eliminated a PJM rule that allowed a prior 
exemption for projects to make minimum offer prices when tempered by state 
energy programs. Id. The pending lawsuit in New Jersey asserts that the state 
law is in violation of the Constitution’s dormant Commerce Clause both 
because it is predicated on in-state “favoritism,” and the New Jersey act is a 
“blatant and explicit effort to promote the construction of new generation 
facilities in New Jersey.” Northey, supra; see also PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. 
Hanna, No. 11-745, 2013 WL 5603896 (D.N.J. Oct. 11, 2013) (finding a state 
pilot project preempted by the Federal Power Act and therefore 
unconstitutional in violation of the Supremacy Clause); PPL EnergyPlus, LLC 
v. Nazarian, No. MJG-12-1286, 2013 WL 5432346 (D. Md. Sept. 30, 2013) 
(finding state generation order unconstitutional in violation of the Supremacy 
Clause). 
 124. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Nazarian, No. MJG-12-1286, 2013 WL 
5432346 (D. Md. Sept. 30, 2013). 
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to violate the Commerce Clause, but both to violate the 
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution; 
 Suit involving renewable power RPS RECs in 
Colorado;125 
 Suit on Missouri RPS RECs limited to only in-state 
projects;126 and 
 TransCanada’s suit against Massachusetts on 
discrimination against out-of-state energy projects for 
RPS RECs and renewable energy contracts,127 which was 
partially settled in favor of the challengers.128 
With approximately half of the thirty-eight RPS states 
engaging in some sort of in-state favoritism with these state 
incentives,129 and each state doing so in an individualized 
                                                          
 125. See Complaint for Injunctive & Declaratory Relief at 2, Am. Tradition 
Inst. v. Colorado, No. 11-cv-00859 (D. Colo. Apr. 4, 2011). American Tradition 
Institute’s (ATI) Environmental Law Center filed a lawsuit in federal court 
challenging the constitutionality of Colorado’s renewable energy standard, 
based upon evidence that the state’s law violates the Commerce Clause. Id. at 
2, 5–6. ATI’s complaint argued that because the state mandate provides 
economic benefits to Colorado’s renewable electricity generators that are not 
available to out-of-state power generators, the program violates the dormant 
Commerce Clause. Id. at 16–21. 
 126. See State ex rel. Mo. Energy Dev. Assoc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Mo., 
No. 10AC-CC00512, at 14 (Cole Cnty. Ct. June 29, 2011) (holding that the 
RPS program “takes the cash property of utilities (and their ratepayers) and 
transfers it to certain customers” without due process). The state trial court in 
2011 ruled that the Missouri RPS program was illegal because it required 
RECs to be generated by in-state projects or projects that delivered the power 
to in-state customers. Id. at 11. The decision was reversed on appeal. State ex 
rel. Mo. Energy Dev. Ass’n v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Mo., 386 S.W.3d 165 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 2012). 
 127. See Complaint at 1, TransCanada Power Mktg. Ltd. v. Bowles, No. 
4:10-cv-40070 (D. Mass. Apr. 16, 2010). In April 2010, TransCanada sued 
Massachusetts, alleging dormant Commerce Clause violations regarding 
requirements that state utilities enter long-term contracts with in-state new 
renewable energy projects and that solar renewable energy credits be earned 
only by in-state solar photovoltaic power projects, regardless of where the 
power generation creating the RECs was sold. Id. at 5–19. TransCanada 
alleged that Massachusetts’s ratepayers would be negatively impacted 
because they would be forced to pay higher rates for only in-state renewable 
energy. Id. at 8. 
 128. Notice of Partial Dismissal of Action and Partial Settlement 
Agreement at 1–3, TransCanada Power Mktg. Ltd. v. Bowles, No. 4:10-cv-
40070 (D. Mass. May 2010), available at http://www.mass.gov/eea/
docs/doer/renewables/solar/settlement-agreement.pdf. 
 129. See supra notes 71–98 and accompanying text. 
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manner,130 this foretells a long period of potential individual 
legal challenge. 
IV. THE THIRD DIMENSION: MERGING                          
TWO DIMENSIONS 
Both the Supremacy Clause of our First Dimension and the 
dormant Commerce Clause of our Second Dimension are 
combined in Vermont regulations,131 which are now under 
serious constitutional challenge regarding energy regulation.132 
Similar multi-dimensional constitutional challenges were made 
in New Jersey133 and Maryland.134 While these cases do not 
concern traditional renewable power, Vermont addresses 
nuclear power, which shares a low-carbon profile with 
renewable energy sources, and which is bundled with 
renewable power in some congressional legislation.135 In this 
ongoing dispute, Vermont denied an existing operating power 
generation facility from a state permit for continuing operation 
unless it sold a substantial portion of its electric output in 
wholesale transactions to state utilities at discounted rates to 
market prices set in the regional ISO New England (ISO-NE) 
wholesale market.136 
The outcome of this issue illustrates the costs to citizens 
when the state regulates without careful consideration of 
constitutional requirements: when the suit was initiated in 
2011, Vermont asked the court initially that the plaintiff 
energy company should pay the state’s, as well as its own, legal 
                                                          
 130. See supra notes 122–28 and accompanying text. 
 131. See Act 74, 2005 Vt. Acts & Resolves 599; Act 160, 2006 Vt. Acts & 
Resolves 204; Act 189, 2008 Vt. Acts & Resolves 478 (requiring affirmative 
legislative approval for storage of spent nuclear fuel). 
 132. See Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 838 F. Supp. 2d 
183, 188–90 (D. Vt. 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, Entergy Nuclear Vt. 
Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, No. 12-791-cv (2d Cir. Aug. 14, 2013) (holding that 
the enactments are preempted by the Atomic Energy Act, making them 
constitutionally invalid). 
 133. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Hanna, No. 11-745, 2013 WL 5603896 
(D.N.J. Oct. 11, 2013) (finding state regulation unconstitutional). 
 134. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Nazarian, No. MJG-12-1286, 2013 WL 
5432346 (D. Md. Sept. 30, 2013) (finding state regulation unconstitutional). 
 135. See, e.g., Michael Vickerman, Commentary: Wisconsin Legislature 
Weighs Nuclear Option for Renewables, MIDWEST ENERGY NEWS (Mar. 4, 
2013), http://www.midwestenergynews.com/2013/03/04/commentary-
wisconsin-legislature-weighs-nuclear-option-for-renewables/. 
 136. See Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, 838 F. Supp. 2d at 236. 
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expenses of the litigation.137 The outcome of this case, however, 
turned the tables when it was found that the state had taken 
an unconstitutional action: it enacted energy regulation that 
the federal court found unconstitutional.138 The state was found 
responsible for reimbursing the plaintiff’s legal fees, which 
were around $5 million at the trial court level and, with appeal, 
continuing to mount until later reversed on appeal.139 Similar 
requests for attorney fees to plaintiffs who successfully 
challenged state energy regulation are now pending in New 
Jersey,140 Maryland,141 and California.142 
In 2012, the federal district court ruled that this Vermont 
regulation of energy violated at once, both of the first 
dimension (preemption) and second dimension (dormant 
Commerce Clause) constitutional limitations on state energy 
regulation.143 Vermont could not discriminate against sale of 
power interstate outside of its origin in Vermont.144 
This opinion followed the Supreme Court decision in New 
England Power Co. v. New Hampshire.145 New England Power 
overturned, as a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause, an 
order of the State Public Utilities Commission that restrained 
within the state for the financial advantage of in-state 
ratepayers, renewable power produced within the state146: 
                                                          
 137. Anne Galloway, Shumlin Wants to “Bill Back” Legal Expenses in 
Entergy Suit to Entergy, VTDIGGER.ORG (Apr. 30, 2011), http://vtdigger.org/
2011/04/30/shumlin-wants-to-%E2%80%9Cbill-back%E2%80%9D-legal-
expenses-in-entergy-suit-to-entergy/. 
 138. See Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, 838 F. Supp. 2d at 242–43. 
 139. Id.; Andrew Stein, Entergy May be Closing Vermont Yankee, But 
Litigation Goes On, VTDIGGER.ORG (Sept. 10, 2013), http://vtdigger.org/
2013/09/10/entergy-may-be-closing-vermont-yankee-but-litigation-goes-on/; see 
Kristin Carlson, Court: Vermont Yankee Can Stay Open, WCAX.COM (Aug. 14, 
2013, 9:38 AM), www.wcax.com/story/23134529/appeals-court-rules-for-
entergy-against-vermont. 
 140. Motion for Attorney Fees, PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Hanna, No. 11-745 
(D.N.J. Nov. 25, 2013). 
 141. Motion for Attorney Fees, PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Nazarian, No. 
MJG-12-1286 (D. Md. Nov. 7, 2013). 
 142. Motion for Attorney Fees, Planning and Conservation League v. 
California, No. RG 12626904 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Nov. 26, 2013). 
 143. Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, 838 F. Supp. 2d at 242–43. 
 144. See id.; see also id. at 236. 
 145. 455 U.S. 331, 338–39 (1982). 
 146. Id. at 336, 338–39; see also U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress 
shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among 
the several States . . . .”). 
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“[We] consistently have held that the Commerce Clause of the 
Constitution . . . precludes a state from mandating that its 
residents be given a preferred right of access, over out‐of‐state 
consumers, to natural resources located within its borders or to 
the products derived therefrom.”147 
The Vermont court in 2012 reiterated that “states are 
‘without power to prevent privately owned articles of trade 
from being shipped and sold in interstate commerce on the 
ground that they are required to satisfy local demands or 
because they are needed by the people of the State’ . . . a 
‘protectionist regulation’ violating the Commerce Clause.”148 
The state also could not regulate or condition any wholesale 
power transactions.149 The court stated: 
Under the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 791a et seq.: 
Congress has drawn a bright line between state and 
federal authority in the setting of wholesale rates and in 
the regulation of agreements that affect wholesale rates. 
States may not regulate in areas where FERC has properly 
exercised its jurisdiction to determine just and reasonable 
wholesale rates or to insure that agreements affecting 
wholesale rates are reasonable . . . . 
Furthermore, a state, “must . . . give effect to Congress’ desire to 
give FERC plenary authority over interstate wholesale rates, and to 
ensure that the States do not interfere with this authority.” 
Under the “filed-rate doctrine,” state courts and regulatory 
agencies are preempted by federal law from requiring the payment 
of rates other than the federal filed rate.150 
In the Third Dimension, the constitutional issues of both of 
the First and Second Dimensions have combined. 
V. THE FOURTH DIMENSION: COPPER AND               
FIRST REFUSAL 
There are other dimensions. Here we focus on several 
states that have regulated whether out-of-state companies that 
would want to construct electric transmission facilities are 
                                                          
 147. New Eng. Power Co., 455 U.S. at 338 (citations omitted) (quoting 
Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 10 (1928)). 
 148. Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, 838 F. Supp. 2d at 236 (quoting New 
England Power, 455 U.S. at 338–39). 
 149. Id. at 233. 
 150. Id. at 233–34 (citations omitted). 
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barred in favor of in-state companies.151 This type of regulation 
raises constitutional issues.152 There is a potential conflict 
between federal jurisdiction and the in-state transmission 
decisions of some states on the issue of who builds the means to 
transmit power.153 To date, electric power requires a 
transmission network to be usable.154 
A.     IN THE ELECTRIC FIELD 
Electrons, which are energy, are never consumed; their 
velocity and force of movement is diminished as electricity is 
used. Their movement creates an electro-magnetic field, which 
is a mechanism to transfer energy from the point of original 
movement along a conductive wire to a distant place on the 
transmission network. In key ways, the movement of electricity 
is not delivering a commodity, but allowing others to realize 
benefits from the velocity and force of the movement itself.155 
We do not “consume” electrons, but rather we consume work 
created by their movement.156 Electric circuits are a means for 
conveying current energy from one place to another.157 Current 
is the rate of flow of electric charge from one region to another 
in a circuit.158 Because the motions of the electrons are random, 
there is no net flow of charge in any direction inside the copper 
wire.159 
                                                          
 151. Cf. RISHI GARG, NAT’L REGULATORY RESEARCH INST., WHAT’S BEST 
FOR THE STATES: A FEDERALLY IMPOSED COMPETITIVE SOLICITATION MODEL 
OR A PREFERENCE FOR THE INCUMBENT? STATE ADOPTION OF RIGHT OF FIRST 
REFUSAL STATUTES IN RESPONSE TO FERC ORDER 1000 AND THE DORMANT 
COMMERCE CLAUSE, at iv (2013), available at http://communities.nrri.org/
documents/317330/d852a44f-0e5e-48d5-8aaa-2e09f167c24a (analyzing right-
of-first-refusal statutes enacted in Minnesota, North Dakota, and South 
Dakota, and proposed in New Mexico and Oklahoma). 
 152. See id. (analyzing whether the right-of-first-refusal statutes are 
constitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause). 
 153. See, e.g., New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2002). 
 154. See Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission 
Owning & Operating Pub. Utils., 136 FERC ¶ 61,051, ¶ 116 (2011) (stating 
that transmission networks improve the delivery of electricity). 
 155. See Steven Ferrey, Inverting Choice of Law in the Wired Universe: 
Thermodynamics, Mass, and Energy, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1839, 1863–64 
(2004). 
 156. See id. 
 157. HUGH D. YOUNG & ROGER A. FREEDMAN, UNIVERSITY PHYSICS 799 
(9th ed. 1996). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 800. 
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All this changes when an electric field is applied to the 
copper wire.160 There is a very slow motion of the moving 
charges in the direction of the force of the electric field, which 
is resultant flow of moving charges is a current in a wire.161 For 
a conductor to have a steady current, it must be part of a path 
that forms a closed loop.162 The influence that makes current 
flow from lower potential to a higher potential is called 
electromotive force163 and is measured as a volt or a 
joule/coulomb.164 The charge moves around the circuit at 
varying levels of potential energy.165 
Some will argue that the electric company is selling its 
customers electrons. In a direct current circuit, the charges 
move the whole length of the circuit.166 In theory then, if an 
electric company used direct current, electrons from the copper 
coil turned by the turbine would eventually make their way 
into our homes. But the customer does not consume these 
electrons; only the energy they are carrying is consumed by the 
end user.167 Furthermore, for every electron that a customer 
receives from the electric company, the electric company 
receives an electron from the customer; the charge is never 
consumed nor created.168 The charges are all there in the 
beginning and at the end.169 
Electricity is transmitted, however, via alternating 
current.170 Because the current is constantly changing 
direction, the electrons do not flow around the circuit, but 
oscillate in a confined area, delivering energy in the form of an 
energized electric field.171 Electricity is neither tangible nor 
                                                          
 160. See id. at 804, 809. 
 161. See id. at 808. 
 162. Id. at 809. 
 163. Id. 
 164. See id. at 165 (stating that a joule is a unit of energy); id. at 675 
(stating that coulomb is a unit of charge). 
 165. See id. at 809. 
 166. See id. 
 167. Ferrey, supra note 155, at 1863–64. 
 168. Id. at 1910–14. 
 169. See 2 INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 33, § 2:1, at 2–4, § 2:1.1, at 2–
8; THE NEW RULES, supra note 33, at 211–32. 
 170. See YOUNG & FREEDMAN, supra note 155, at 850. 
 171. See, e.g., Craig T. Liljestrand, EMFs and the Potential for Injury: Real 
Danger or Overreaction?, 62 DEF. COUNS. J. 400, 400–401 (1995). 
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movable.172 The courts have determined that electrons in 
interstate commerce cannot be traced.173 Notwithstanding, the 
FERC has held seven times that electricity is a tangible good 
governed by the Uniform Commercial Code.174 
B. RIGHTS OF FIRST REFUSAL 
Can states require that additional transmission facilities 
be built by incumbent in-state businesses? Recall that 
transmission really is everything: it is not the copper molecule 
electrons, but the movement of these electrons, that creates 
and delivers electric power.175 Therefore, speaking of the 
physical reality rather than the legal fiction, transmission is 
everything. Copper is everything. 
The FERC has attempted to regulate who builds new 
transmission capacity.176 The FERC exclusively regulates 
transmission transactions and tariffs.177 FERC Order 1000 
requires incumbent transmission providers, utilities, to remove 
rights-of-first-refusal (ROFR) from FERC-approved tariffs.178 
And all transmission tariffs are exclusively within FERC, 
rather than state, jurisdiction.179 The FERC does not regulate 
the construction of transmission facilities themselves, only 
economic tariffs for their transactions.180 Failure to consider 
and evaluate nonincumbent projects could violate the FERC 
                                                          
 172. Ferrey, supra note 155, at 1864. 
 173. See New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 7 n.5 (2002) (discussing Fed. 
Power Comm’n v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453 (1972)). 
 174. Ferrey, supra note 155, at 1891. 
 175. Id. at 1910–12. 
 176. See Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission 
Owning & Operating Pub. Utils. (Order 1000), 136 FERC ¶ 61,051, ¶¶ 253–
254, 258 (2011). 
 177. Ferrey, supra note 155, at 1889. 
 178. Transmission Planning, 136 FERC, ¶ 7. For an excellent treatment of 
this, see generally GARG, supra note 151 (summarizing and analyzing the 
impact of FERC Order 1000). 
 179. See Transmission Planning, 136 FERC, ¶ 287. 
 180. See id. This pertains only to Commission-jurisdictional tariffs or 
agreements and does not require removal of references to such state or local 
laws or regulations from Commission-approved tariffs or agreements. See id. 
¶ 253 n.231. The FERC noted that Order 1000 does not address the prudence 
of investment decisions nor determine which particular entity should 
construct any particular transmission facility, but merely to allow more 
entities to be considered for potential construction responsibility. Id. ¶ 290. 
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Order 890 planning principle of “openness” in transmission 
planning.181 
Nonetheless, some states have enacted ROFR statutes: for 
example, three states have enacted these,182 and a few other 
states have proposed them.183 Minnesota has enacted an ROFR 
statute that confers upon the incumbent “the right to construct, 
own, and maintain an electric transmission line that has been 
approved for construction in a federally registered planning 
authority transmission plan and connects to facilities owned by 
that incumbent electric transmission owner.”184 South Dakota 
created an ROFR, which confers to the incumbent “[t]he right 
to construct, own, and maintain an electric transmission line 
that connects to facilities owned by [the incumbent utility 
grid].”185 North Dakota conferred an ROFR to the incumbent 
transmission provider under a certificate of public convenience 
and necessity, which cannot be issued to another if the existing 
public utility is willing and able to construct and operate a 
similar electric transmission line.186 
Other states have proposed statutes as well.187 Except for 
North Dakota, each state’s actual or proposed statute confers 
upon an in-state incumbent transmission company the right to 
construct a facility identified and approved for construction in a 
federally approved FERC plan, at the expense of a potential 
competitor, contrary to the FERC’s order.188 And this 
regulatory issue raises both of the previously discussed 
constitutional issues.189 First, there is a Supremacy Clause 
issue lurking in states adopting ROFR despite federal FERC 
prohibition of such provisions, when the FERC has exclusive 
                                                          
 181. See id. ¶ 229. 
 182. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 216B.246 (2012); N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-03-01 
(2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 49-32-19 (2011); GARG, supra note 151, at      
10–13. 
 183. E.g., S. 175, 51st Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2013); see also GARG, supra 
note 151, at 11–13 (describing several states’ proposed ROFR bills). 
 184. MINN. STAT. § 216B.246, subdiv. 2 (2012). 
 185. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 49-32-20 (2011). 
 186. N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-03-01 (2011). 
 187. See, e.g., S. 175, 51st Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2013) (articulating New 
Mexico’s proposed ROFR language). 
 188. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-03-01 (2011), with MINN. STAT. 
§ 216B.246 (2012), and S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 49-32-19 (2011). 
 189. GARG, supra note 151, at iv. 
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authority to oversee such transactions.190 Second, there is a 
dormant Commerce Clause issue when states favor in-state 
incumbent providers of electric transmission service in lieu of 
other or out-of-state providers.191 This is potentially a 
constitutional issue, in addition to being contrary to a federal 
order issued pursuant to the FERC’s federal authority.192 
VI. THE FIFTH DIMENSION: BEYOND POWER                  
TO CLIMATE 
A. STATE CARBON CONTROL REGULATION 
In the absence of federal climate change legislation in the 
United States, nine states (at one time ten states after 
Massachusetts later joined, and now reduced to nine 
Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic states after New Jersey 
withdrew193) have combined into the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative (RGGI) to regulate only CO2 from their larger power 
plants.194 The RGGI states, as well as California,195 identified 
ways to arrest so-called “leakage” into the state of less-costly 
                                                          
 190. See id. at 17–18. 
 191. See id. at 13–17. 
 192. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 797(g) (2012) (granting authority to 
the FERC to issue orders in the interest of the public). 
 193. See Welcome, REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org 
(last visited Oct. 29, 2013) (noting that the nine states include Connecticut, 
Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, 
Rhode Island, and Vermont). 
 194. Id; see DAVID FARNSWORTH ET AL., REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS 
INITIATIVE, POTENTIAL EMISSIONS LEAKAGE AND THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE 
GAS INITIATIVE (RGGI): EVALUATING MARKET DYNAMICS, MONITORING 
OPTIONS, AND POSSIBLE MITIGATION MECHANISMS, at ES-1 (2007), available 
at http://www.rggi.org/docs/il_report_final_3_14_07.pdf. Seven states signed 
the RGGI Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) originally and a few others 
later on; however, New Jersey recently withdrew, see Mireya Navarro, 
Christie Pulls New Jersey from 10-State Climate Initiative, N.Y. TIMES, May 
26, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/27/nyregion/christie-pulls-nj-from-
greenhouse-gas-coalition.html?_r=0, and other states have considered 
withdrawal from this cap-and-trade program. Amy Quinton, Three States 
Consider Withdrawal from RGGI, NEWBIOMASSNH (Apr. 7, 2011), 
http://www.newbiomassnh.org/three-states-consider-withdrawal-from-rggi. 
 195. CAP & TRADE SUBGROUP, CLIMATE ACTION TEAM, CAP AND TRADE 
PROGRAM DESIGN OPTIONS: FINAL REPORT 34–35 (2006), available at 
http://www.climatechange.ca.gov/climate_action_team/reports/2006report/200
6-03-27_CAP_AND_TRADE.PDF. 
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power whose carbon content is not regulated or affected.196 The 
RGGI Staff Working Group investigated whether a substantial 
proportion of CO2 emissions avoided by the RGGI could be offset 
and lost by corresponding increases of cheaper fossil fuel 
electric generation in non-RGGI states,197 with early 
modeling under a “middle-of-the-road” scenario estimating 
leakage of CO2 at 27% depending on the programmatic 
assumptions,198 though earlier modeling and a “high” scenario 
placed the leakage percentage higher.199 The governors in 
affected states agreed to “pursue technically sound measures to 
prevent leakage from undermining the integrity of the 
Program.”200 Because states do not want the greenhouse gas 
(GHG) carbon costs that they impose on their in-state power 
generators, which are then passed on to those utilities’ in-state 
consumers, to lead to higher-carbon out-of-state power imports 
of cheaper fossil-fueled power, they considered securing 
borders, or at least a power import surcharge to dissuade 
intruding power flows.201 
“Leakage” is not some kind of physical breach of power 
engineering.202 Rather, it is the mere consumer or buyer 
preference for lower-priced commodities and services, even if 
they originate from outside the state.203 California imports 
power from eleven states, including a large amount of coal-fired 
power, and California’s choice to regulate carbon at the point of 
generation is necessary for California to get at the problem of 
                                                          
 196. See FARNSWORTH ET AL., supra note 194, at ES-1. RGGI States such 
as New Jersey, New York, Maryland, and Delaware are bordered by states 
that are not signatories to the RGGI and do historically produce a large 
volume of electricity from coal-fueled power plants. See id. at ES-1, 9. 
Similarly, California imports power from eleven states, including a large 
amount of coal-fired power. See CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, 2006 NET SYSTEM 
POWER REPORT 1 (2007), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/
2007publications/CEC-300-2007-007/CEC-300-2007-007.PDF. 
 197. See FARNSWORTH ET AL., supra note 194, at ES-1 to ES-2.  
 198. Id. at 9. 
 199. The Author has observed that RGGI has removed earlier modeling 
estimates projecting a higher leakage percentage from its website. 
 200. REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, MEMORANDUM OF 
UNDERSTANDING 10 (2005), available at www.rggi.org/design/history/mou. 
 201. See id. The governors in affected states agreed to “pursue technically 
sound measures to prevent leakage from undermining the integrity of the 
program.” Id. 
 202. See FARNSWORTH ET AL., supra note 194, at ES-1. 
 203. Id. 
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high-carbon power leakage into the state.204 Wholesale 
electricity is moving constantly in interstate commerce at the 
speed of light.205 Leakage barriers typically attempt to arrest 
electricity in interstate commerce under normal market 
conditions.206 
In a suit against the State of New York’s RGGI program in 
2009, New York’s quick settlement had Consolidated Edison 
Company agreeing to pay the plaintiff cogeneration project for 
the cost of its additional carbon allowances through the end of 
their preexisting long-term contracts.207 New York’s 
participation in the RGGI was challenged a second time in 
2011 as being without proper legislative approval and only 
implemented by regulation.208 
California has begun comprehensive regulation of all 
GHGs from all sources.209 The California carbon scheme 
requires that California reduce GHG emissions to 1990 levels 
by 2020, considering all in-state and out-of-state generation 
used to serve California’s electric load.210 California and other 
carbon-regulating states, however, must avoid regulating in a 
way that impermissibly burdens interstate commerce in 
electricity. Such burdens are not required to be direct 
prohibitions of power imports. 
                                                          
 204. See CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, supra note 196, at 1; see also HARVARD 
ELEC. POLICY GRP., FORTY-NINTH PLENARY SESSION, RAPPORTEUR’S 
SUMMARY 39 (2007), available at www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/
RapporteurReport12-07.pdf. 
 205. See 1 INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 140, § 2:1; Ferrey, supra note 
155, at 1889. 
 206. Cf. FARNSWORTH ET AL. supra note 194, at 42–43 (describing the 
potential impact of leakage barriers on electric system reliability). 
 207. See Press Release, Peter A. Barden, Indeck Energy Sues State 
Questioning Legality of Regional Greenhouse Gas Program (Jan. 29, 2009), 
available at http://www.indeckenergy.com/pdfnews/RGGI%20Lawsuit%
20012909%20.pdf; Vicki Shiah, Settlement Reached in Regional Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative Lawsuit, SPR ENVTL. L. BLOG (Jan. 14, 2010, 2:28 PM), 
http://blog.sprlaw.com/2010/01/settlement-reached-in-regional-greenhouse-
gas-initiative-lawsuit/. 
 208. Geoffrey Craig & Gail Roberts, Lawsuit Disputes Legality of New York 
Participation in RGGI, Citing Lack of Legislative Approval, ELEC. UTIL. WK., 
July 4, 2011, at 10. 
 209. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38500–38599 (West 1996). 
 210. Assemb. B. 32, Ch. 488, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006). The bill sets 
a firm limit on GHG emissions in California by requiring the Air Resources 
Board to determine California’s GHG emission level in 1990 and then issue 
regulations causing GHG emissions to be reduced to that level by 2020. Id. 
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B. BEYOND ELECTRICITY: CLEAN FUELS 
As part of its GHG regulation, California regulated clean 
fuel, factoring in the determination of the credit value and 
discrimination regarding out-of-state fuels based on the 
distance the fuel must travel (using fossil fuels for 
transportation) to reach California markets, as well as the 
extent to which coal and other fossil fuels are used to produce 
electricity.211 A.B. 32, the California Global Warming Solutions 
Act of 2006, requires the California Air Resources Board 
(CARB) to develop a comprehensive plan to reduce GHG 
emissions in the state to its historic 1990 levels by the year 
2020.212 As part of this, the purpose of the low carbon fuel 
standard (LCFS) is “to implement a low carbon fuel standard, 
which will reduce greenhouse gas emissions by reducing the 
full fuel-cycle, carbon intensity of the transportation fuel pool 
used in California . . . .”213 It requires providers of gasoline and 
diesel fuels to calculate the carbon intensity (CI) of each fuel 
component, report such calculations to CARB, and make 
reductions in order to meet the carbon intensity standards.214 
The greater carbon-emission-intensity of electricity produced in 
the Midwest used to create these cleaner fuels devalued out-of-
state cleaner fuels in the California regulation.215 
A California federal trial court held that a state violates 
the dormant Commerce Clause if it discriminates against out-
                                                          
 211. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 
1080 (E.D. Cal. 2011), rev’d, Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 
F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 212. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38,500–38,599 (West 2012). 
 213. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95480 (2013). 
 214. Id. 
 215. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1086–87. The 
court reiterated that only the federal government can regulate commerce 
between the states, and California, attempting to regulate commerce outside 
its borders, violates exclusive federal authority to regulate interstate 
commerce. Id. at 1094. California gave less value to the identical energy fuel, 
ethanol, when produced in the Midwest because of the latter region’s use of 
coal-fired power for electricity used to produce ethanol and other products and 
the longer transportation distance for trucks to transport ethanol from there 
to California. See id. at 1086–87. While such discrimination did reflect the 
total embedded energy emissions and transportation costs of different means 
to produce the energy products and to move them to market from 
geographically distant production sources, the court held that states cannot 
elect to discriminate against more distant, out-of-state products. Id. at 1088–
89. 
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of-state energy products based on the distance it must travel 
from out of state and the greater carbon-intensity of electricity 
used at the source of the production to produce the renewable 
fuel.216 The court reiterated that only the federal government 
can regulate commerce between the states, and California, in 
attempting to regulate commerce outside its borders, violated 
exclusive federal authority to regulate interstate commerce.217 
The court again distinguished motive from constitutional 
requirements, holding, “[a]lthough [the state’s] goal to combat 
global warming may be ‘legitimate,’ . . . it cannot ‘be achieved 
by the illegitimate means of isolating the State from the 
national economy.’”218 
The Ninth Circuit, however, reversed the decision, holding 
that the regulations were not facially discriminatory, the 
transportation and electricity source factors used in the 
regulations were permissible under the general ability of states 
to act as laboratories for experimentation, and that the 
regulations did not exceed California’s authority under the 
dormant Commerce Clause.219 The dissenting opinion in the 
Ninth Circuit decision found there was facial discrimination.220 
Of four federal judges who ruled on this case at the trial and 
appellate levels, two found it unconstitutional, while two did 
not.221 At the time of this writing, a motion for rehearing en 
banc was pending,222 with a motion for a writ of certiorari to 
follow next. 
                                                          
 216. Id. at 1088. 
 217. Id. at 1094. 
 218. Id. at 1088–89 (quoting City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 
617, 626 (1978)). 
 219. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 
2013). 
 220. Id. at 1108 (Murgia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 221. Judge O’Neill for the Eastern District of California and Judge Murgia 
for the Ninth Circuit found the regulations unconstitutional, while Judges 
Gould and Nelson for the Ninth Circuit did not. Rocky Mountain Farmers 
Union, 730 F.3d 1070; Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071. 
 222. See Keith Goldberg, 9th Circuit Urged to Rethink Calif. Carbon Fuel 
Standard, LAW360 (Oct. 3, 2013, 5:16 PM), http://www.law360.com/
articles/477847/9th-circ-urged-to-rethink-calif-carbon-fuel-standard. 
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C. CLIMATE IS INTERNATIONAL 
To the extent unparalleled by any other emissions, climate 
control is international.223 GHGs emitted in any U.S. state, or 
anywhere in the world, exert similar warming of the planet.224 
There were GHG reduction-funding pledges made by developed 
countries, including the United States (even though it has not 
ratified the Kyoto Protocol) over a period of years at the annual 
Conference of Parties (CoP)225: 
 At CoP-3 forming the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which now 
has 192 parties;226 
 At the 2007 Bali Conference of the Parties (CoP-13);227 
 At the 2009 Copenhagen CoP-15;228 
                                                          
 223. See Kyoto Protocol, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php (last visited 
Oct. 10, 2013) (“The Kyoto Protocol is an international agreement linked to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change . . . .”). 
 224. See id. 
 225. See id.; Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, UNITED NATIONS 
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/
kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php (last visited Oct. 10, 
2013). 
 226. See A Brief History of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, EARTH 
NEGOTIATIONS BULL. (Int’l Inst. for Sustainable Dev., New York, N.Y.) Dec. 
11, 2012, at 2 available at www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb12567e.pdf. The so-
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annual meeting to attempt to implement the goals of the Protocol. See United 
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06a01.pdf#page=3; Jessica Aldred, Q&A: Bali Climate Change Conference, 
THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 3, 2007, 12:05 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/
environment/2007/nov/30/bali.climatechange; Deal Agreed in Bali Climate 
Talks, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 15, 2007, 7:33 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/
environment/2007/dec/15/bali.climatechange4. 
 228. See COP 16: UN Conference Delegates Debate Source of Climate 
Change Funds, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/
12/08/cop-16-un-conference-dele_n_794094.html (last updated May 25, 2011, 
7:15 PM). The Copenhagen Conference of the Parties (CoP-15), which took 
place in December 2009, was intended to establish an ambitious global climate 
change agreement for the post-2012 period, when the Kyoto Protocol expires. 
See Summary: Copenhagen Climate Summit, CENTER FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY 
SOLUTIONS, http://www.c2es.org/international/negotiations/cop-15/summary 
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 At the 2010 Cancún CoP-16 with agreement on the 
“Cancún Agreements” to try to limit GHG emissions to 
hold temperature rise to 1.5 degrees Celsius229 and 
establishing a new Green Climate Fund and standing 
committees and a fast-start pledge;230 
 At the 2011 Durban CoP-17, which reached some 
advance on the Green Climate Fund;231 and 
 At the 2012 Doha CoP-18, which needed to adopt a 
second commitment period.232 
At the 2012 Doha CoP-18, and at the Copenhagen CoP-15, 
there was a $30 billion financing commitment of developed 
countries to finance developing country GHG emission 
mitigation and adaption efforts by 2012 and a $100 billion 
annual commitment by 2020.233 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The solicitation notice for the conference foursquare set the 
stage for this conference: 
First, we do not have the legal, institutional, or physical 
infrastructure to transition to cleaner energy sources . . . we do not 
have effective governance strategies for complex, multi-level 
problems that predominate at the intersection of environmental and 
energy law . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . 
Many of our most daunting environmental and energy 
challenges cross jurisdictional boundaries, involve multiple levels of 
governance (e.g., local, state, regional, national, international), or 
both. Natural systems do not respect the artificial territorial and 
jurisdictional boundaries of governments, whether at the local, state, 
or national levels . . . . With no single institution well-positioned to 
                                                          
(last visited Oct. 26, 2013). The Conference only produced a thirteen-
paragraph “political accord,” which was not an official product of the meeting 
and was only “noted” by the Conference because of lack of a consensus among 
world nations. See id. This comprises the regulatory fabric insulating the 
world against global warming. 
 229. A Brief History of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, supra note 
226, at 2. 
 230. See id. A Standing Committee was created to attempt to deal with the 
funding mechanism. Id. 
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solve the problem, it may simply fall between the cracks; or it may be 
addressed partially and inadequately by one or more well-intentioned 
institutional actors . . . .234 
Let me underscore several statements in this preamble to 
the conference: 
 The shortcoming is appropriate legal and regulatory 
structure, even more than physical infrastructure. 
 States have strategies, but they are not effective 
strategies when they do not mesh with the requirements 
of the Constitution and the Federal Power Act noted in 
the First Dimension. 
 Power seldom stops at state boundaries. State policies 
that distinguish between the geographic origin of 
commerce in power are at risk in the Second Dimension, 
if challenged. 
 Some of the state regulation of power enters the Third 
Dimension, invoking several constitutional trip-wires. 
 When we look at hardware and other fuels, there are 
still other dimensions. 
There is a substantial need for sustainable electric power 
development. It is the key infrastructure that will determine 
the future carbon footprint. And the current sustainable energy 
policy is largely implemented at the state, rather than federal, 
level of government. Many of these state policies are 
confronting Supremacy and dormant Commerce Clause 
constitutional challenges. It is not that we lack energy 
infrastructure; rather, we lack legally smart implementation of 
energy infrastructure. It is enough to note that the challenges 
are several, raise significant legal issues, and are ongoing. 
In fairness, constitutional infrastructure and governance 
are not the only challenges to renewable energy projects. A 
number of renewable energy projects have been the subject of 
individual litigation challenge over the past decade, as opposed 
to challenge to an entire state regulatory program supporting 
certain incentives for renewable energy. One study tracked 
sixty challenges to thirty-four projects involving solar, wind, 
biomass, geothermal, and other areas of renewable energy.235 
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 235. See Janice Schneider & Taiga Takahashi, A Snapshot of Renewable 
Energy Project Litigation, LAW360 (Dec. 6, 2012, 10:23 AM), 
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Roughly half were still in litigation, eight were settled, and 
eight ended in a court decision.236 These challenges involved 
the National Environmental Policy Act and its state analogue 
statutes, the National Historic Preservation Act, the 
Endangered Species Act, and various land-use laws.237 Three of 
the eighteen completed suits resulted in the projects being 
cancelled or withdrawn.238 
Regardless of legal challenges, renewable energy is a 
critical part of the energy future.239 Renewables are virtually 
inexhaustible.240 Energy used by humankind on the earth 
equals only about 0.01% of the total solar energy reaching the 
earth.241 Solar energy provides as much potential energy to the 
entire globe every seventy minutes as humankind uses in the 
entirety of each year,242 In fact, no nation on earth uses more 
energy than the energy content contained in the sunlight that 
strikes its existing buildings every day.243 The solar energy 
that falls on roads in the United States each year contains 
roughly as much energy content as all the fossil fuel consumed 
in the world during that same year.244 Wind power’s global 
energy potential is thirty-five times world electricity use.245 
Exactly a month before this Minnesota conference, the 
Washington Post carried a story under the caption: “The 
Biggest Fight over Renewable Energy is Now in the States.”246 
This statement is an accurate assessment of where the battle 
is—in five dimensions—in current real time.  
                                                          
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. (including the Makah Bay Wave Energy Project, the Goshen South 
Wind Project, and the Pahnamid Wind Project). 
 239. STEVEN FERREY WITH ANIL CABRAAL, RENEWABLE POWER IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: WINNING THE WAR ON GLOBAL WARMING 35 (2006) 
(“Energy is the single most important problem facing humanity today.” 
(quoting Richard Smalley, Nobel Laureate, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 26, 2002, at 
1)). 
 240. See id. 
 241. Id. at 36. 
 242. AMORY B. LOVINS, IMRAN SHEIKH & ALEX MARKEVICH, ROCKY 
MOUNTAIN INST., FORGET NUCLEAR 6 (2008), available at 
http://www.rmi.org/Knowledge-Center/Library/E08-04_ForgetNuclear. 
 243. FERREY WITH CABRAAL, supra note 239, at 36. 
 244. Id. 
 245. LOVINS, SHEIKH & MARKEVICH, supra note 242, at 6. 
 246. See Plumer, supra note 61. 
  
*** 
